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FOURTH AMENDMENT-IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS
United States v. Crews, 100 S. Ct. 1244 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Crews,1 the Supreme Court
further demarcated the limits of the exclusionary
rule as applied to fourth amendment 2 violations.
The Court unanimously held that in-court identi-
fication testimony could not be excluded as the
product of an illegal arrest. In reaching this deci-
sion, the Court failed to employ a complete exclu-
sionary rule analysis, neglecting to consider fully
whether the identification testimony in itself con-
stituted suppressible evidence or whether the pros-
ecution had obtained the testimony as a result of
purposeful, illegal police conduct. Even though the
victim remembered the defendant's face from the
crime, the Court could have considered the victim's
testimony as tainted evidence and excluded it.
Finding no need to employ an exclusionary rule
analysis, five members of the Court summarily
agreed that in-court identification testimony cru-
cial to a successful prosecution could not be sup-
pressed because an illegal arrest cannot bar a de-
fendant's prosecution. However, these Justices
failed to distinguish the commencement of a pros-
ecution from the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
The Crews Court refused to deny prosecutors the
invaluable incriminating evidence of an in-court
identification. In so doing, the Court manifested its
increasing willingness to weigh successful prosecu-
tion more heavily than fourth amendment protec-
tions in deciding whether to apply the exclusionary
rule. While criminal convictions constitute an im-
portant societal interest, the Crews opinion also
reduces the incentive of police to observe fourth
amendment protections.
II. FACTS AND CASE HISTORY
Early in January 1974, a young man robbed a
woman in the restroom at the Washington Na-
tional Monument.3 During the robbery, the victim
1100 S. Ct. 1244 (1980).2 The fourth amendment provides in part that the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . U.S. CONsT. amend.
IV.
3 100 S. Ct. at 1246.
had a good opportunity to view her assailant.4
Soon after the robber left, the woman reported the
incident.5 In the next few days, two similar robber-
ies occurred in the same restrooms with the victims
giving substantially similar descriptions of the as-
sailant.6
Three days after the first incident, a United
States Park Police officer saw Keith Crews in the
area of the restrooms and noticed his resemblance
to police descriptions of the robber. The officer
stopped Crews and allowed him to leave after brief
questioning.7 When the officer's conversation with
a tour guide aroused further suspicion in Crews,
the park police once again detained him at the
Monument." Trying unsuccessfully to photograph
Crews at the site,9 the police took him into custody,
ostensibly for truancy. At police headquarters, po-
lice photographed Crews, called his school, and
released him, never charging him with an offense.'
The next day, police showed the first victim a
photographic array. She immediately identified
Crews as the man who had robbed her. A few days
later, one of the other women made a similar
identification. Police then took Crews into custody,
and the two women identified him at a court-
4 Through the space which separated the partition and
the door of the stall the woman occupied, the assailant
looked at the victim and demanded money. After the
woman complied, the robber gained entry to the stall.
The woman tried to resist his sexual advances, which he
discontinued after a few minutes and left. Id. at 1247.
5 The assailant warned the woman not to leave for
twenty minutes after his departure. When the time had
expired, the victim immediately went to the police. Id.61d.
7 The officer approached Crews, requested his name
and age, asked why he was not in school and informed
Crews of his similarity with the suspect's description. The
officers then allowed Crews to leave, and he entered a
restroom. Id.
8 While Crews was inside the restroom, the officers
spoke to a tour guide who had seen a young man loitering
around the area on the day of the first robbery. When
Crews left the restroom, the guide identified him as the
man he had previously seen. Id.
9 A detective working on the case could not obtain a
clear picture of Crews due to inclement weather. Id.
10 100 S. Ct. at 1247.
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ordered lineup." A grand jury later indicted Crews
on counts of armed robbery and assault.1
2
Before trial, Crews moved to suppress all iden-
tification testimony on the ground that his initial
detention had been a pretext to gain evidence. 3
After hearing testimony, the trial judge concluded
that Crews' initial detention constituted an arrest
without probable cause in violation of the fourth
amendment and thus, he excluded the photo-
graphic and lineup identifications. However, the
judge determined that the victims' ability to iden-
tify Crews in court derived from an independent
recollection, unaffected by the previous identifica-
tions. A jury convicted Crews of robbing the first
woman.
14
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction. 15 The appellate
court agreed that police had detained Crews with-
out probable cause, but the court treated the in-
court identification problem within the framework
of the "poisonous fruits" doctrine. 16 Viewing the
issue as whether the identification had been ob-
tained by an exploitation of illegal police conduct,
the appellate court reasoned that but for the first
unlawful arrest, police would not have obtained
the photographs which led to Crews' subsequent
arrest and in-court identification during prosecu-
tion of the case.17 Finding that none of the excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule'" applied to the facts
in Crews' case, the appellate court held that the
in-court identification should have been sup-
pressed.




5 Crews v. United States, 389 A.2d 277 (D.C. 1978).
'6 The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine derives from
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920), and from the Court's discourse on the exclusion-
ary rule in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).
17 100 S. Ct. at 1249.
is Courts have recognized three exceptions to the ex-
clusionary rule. First, evidence obtained from an inde-
pendent source unrelated to illegal police conduct is
admissible. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385. Second, evidence will not be excluded if
the government would have inevitably discovered it in
the normal, legal course of their investigation. See United
States exre. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858, 865 (7th
Cir. 1974). Finally, if the illegality surrounding the initial
seizure of the evidence has become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint of illegality, the evidence will be
admissible. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939).
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed,' 9 al-
though members of the Court differed as to the
reasons for their reversal. The entire Court agreed
that the appellate court had erroneously deter-
mined that the in-court identification constituted
an evidentiary product tainted by the illegal arrest.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan initially
divided the in-court identification into three ele-
ments. First, the victim is present at trial to testify
to the robbery events. Second, the victim possesses
"knowledge of and the ability to reconstruct the
prior criminal occurrence" and to identify the de-
fendant on the basis of this knowledge.20 Third, the
defendant is present in the courtroom for compar-
ison by the victim with her memory of the assail-
ant.2 The Court found that the victim herself did
not appear in court as the result of any illegality.'s
Since the victim had retrieved a "mnemonic rep-
resentation"' 3 of the robber etched in her mind
during the robbery, the Court reasoned that the
victim's capacity to identify the assailant neither
"resulted from nor was biased by the unlawful
police conduct." 2' Thus, the Court relied on the
trial court's finding that the victim had an inde-
pendent recollection of the defendant's face. Fi-
nally, in reference to the defendant's courtroom
presence, the Court noted that an illegal arrest by
itself never barred a subsequent prosecution.25 The
Court stated that the defendant was "not himself
a suppressible 'fruit'" and that his illegal arrest
could not deprive the government from using un-
tainted evidence.a2
In a portion of the opinion concurred in by
Justices Stewart and Stevens, Justice Brennan fur-
ther discussed whether a defendant's physiog-
nomy27 has evidentiary value and status such that
it could constitute suppressible evidence. Justice
"Justice Marshall took no part in the case.
20 100 S. Ct. at 1250.
21 id.
2 The Court distinguished the instant situation from
one in which police had discovered the victim's identity
through an illegal search or confession. Id.
2' In defining "mnemonic representation" the Court
noted the analogy used by the government. This analogy
"compared the witness' mental image to an undeveloped
photograph of the robber that is given to the police
immediately after the crime, but which becomes devel-
oped only at trial." Id. at 1250 n.16.
2A Id. at 1251.
"' Id. In support of this proposition, the Court cited
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins,
342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
26 100 S. Ct. at 1251.
27 "Physiognomy" refers to a person's physical char-
acteristics such as facial features, height, weight, etc.
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Brennan concluded that this issue need not be
decided in Crews because the police had obtained
specific descriptions of Crews, amounting to the
victims' mnemonic representations at the time,
when they detained him. Thus, the illegal arrest
added nothing to the police investigation.Y8 Bren-
nan distinguished Davis v. Mississippi,29 where po-
lice obtained the defendant's fingerprints during a
dragnet search of suspects, noting that the police
investigation in Crews had focused upon a specific
defendant. Justice Brennan also relied on Bynum v.
United States,3 ° where the court first reversed the
defendant's conviction when police obtained his
fingerprints during an illegal arrest, but upheld a
later reindictment 31 when the government had
used fingerprints on file, unconnected with the
initial arrest. On the basis of Bynum, Justice Bren-
nan concluded that the in-court identification in
Crews was admissible because the "police's knowl-
edge of respondent's identity and the victim's in-
dependent recollection of him both antedated the
unlawful arrest and were thus untainted by the
constitutional violation."3 2 However, Justice Bren-
nan implied that when police did not have "inde-
pendent reasonable grounds to suspect... [an in-
dividual's] culpability," an in-court identification
deriving from an illegal arrest might be suppressi-
ble.3
Justice Powell, with whom Justice Blackmun
joined, did not concur in Brennan's discussion of
Davis and Bynum. Powell found that a defendant's
face could never be a suppressible fruit since under
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine a defendant could always
be tried even if illegally arrested.35
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist, also filed a concurring opin-
ion. Justice White found the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
dispositive. Disdaining Justice Brennan's apparent
attempt to keep open the circumstances in which
in-court identification might be suppressible, Jus-
tice White argued that the "fact that [Crews] was
present at trial and therefore capable of being
identified by the victim is merely the inevitable
result of the trial being held, which is permissible
under Frisbie despite [Crews'] unlawful arrest., 36 In
28 100 S. Ct. at 1252.
293 94 U.S. 721 (1969).
30 262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
3i Bynum v. United States, 274 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir.
1960).
3 100 S. Ct. at 1253.
3 Id. at 1252.
m See note 25 & accompanying text supra.
- 100 S. Ct. at 1253.36 Id. at 1254.
conclusion, Justice White noted that a majority of
the Court agreed that Frisbie foreclosed an argu-
ment that the defendant's face could be a suppres-
sible fruit.
3 7
III. PRINCIPLES OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The factual situation of Crews presented the
Court with the issue of whether any and all evi-
dence obtained from an illegal arrest, including the
victim's in-court identification of the assailant,
should be inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.
The Court declined to suppress the victim's in-
court identification on two grounds: first, such an
identification did not constitute a product of the
illegal arrest, and second, once a defendant is
brought into court, an illegal arrest does not pre-
vent prosecution. A brief review of the exclusionary
rule's principles and applications will help analyze
the two bases for the Court's holding.
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to further
fourth amendment protections by depriving the
prosecution of the use of evidence obtained by
illegal means. In announcing the rule, the Court
stated:
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring
the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are,
are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great
principles established by years of endeavor and suf-
fering which have resulted in their embodiment in
the fundamental law of the land."
The rule is premised upon two policies. First, it
aims to deter unconstitutional police conduct, a
goal which the Court has found can be achieved
by excluding illegally obtained evidence, thereby
removing the incentive to disregard constitutional
guarantees. 9 Second, the rule seeks to maintain
judicial integrity. Since the admission of illegally
obtained evidence implies thejudiciary's approval
of conduct securing the evidence, the Court has
invoked the exclusionary rule to close the "doors of
the federal courts to any use of evidence unconsti-
tutionally obtained."40 Thus, exclusion of illegally
3 Tid.
38 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
3 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347
(1974). For an excellent discussion of the policies under-
lying the exclusionary rule, see Sunderland, Liberals, Con-
servatives, and the Exclusionary Rule, 71 J. Crim. L. & C. 343
(1980).
4°Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486
(1963). The Court has also closed the doors of state courts
to such evidence. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960). See
Sunderland, supra note 39, at 348.
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obtained evidence prevents contamination of the
judicial process.41
The Court has sought to effect these policies by
excluding all products obtained directly and indi-
rectly by illegal means.4 2 However, the Court has
declined to exclude evidence simply because it
would not have been discovered but for illegal
police actions. Instead, the Court has determined
that the relevant inquiry is "'whether granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evi-
dence to which instant objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality instead of
by 'means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint.' "3
The application of the exclusionary rule fre-
quently means the suppression of relevant evi-
dence. Therefore, when applying the rule, the
Court often balances the policies of deterrence and
judicial integrity against the competing interest of
society in the successful prosecution of crime. The
rule does not "proscribe the use of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons."'
Rather, it operates where "its remedial objectives
are thought most efficaciously served. ' 45 The Court
avoids applying the rule when the defendant would
receive a windfall disproportionate to the deter-
rence value of applying the rule in a particular
case.
46
In the context of eyewitness identification, the
Court has held that testimony regarding identifi-
cation of a defendant at a pretrial lineup where the
defendant was not represented by counsel must be
excluded in order to guarantee a defendant his
right to counsel at critical stages in a criminal
proceeding.47 In Gilbert v. California,"8 the Court
went one step further, holding that the testimony
of witnesses discovered as a result of the victim's
original defective pretrial identification must be
suppressed. 49 The Court stated that only a per se
exclusion of testimony "can be an effective sanction
41 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1976).
42 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. at 392, whereJustice Holmes stated that the "essence
of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall
not be used before the Court, but that it shall not be used
at all."
43 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting
J. McGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).
44 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
4Id.
4Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 490.
47 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
48 388 U.S. 263.
49 Id. at 273.
to assure that law enforcement authorities will
respect the accused's right to the presence of his
counsel at the critical lineup.
5°
In considering the admissibility of lineup testi-
mony, the Court held in United States v. Wade5' that
in-court identification following a defective lineup
should not be excluded if such identification was
sufficiently independent of the illegal lineup.5 2 The
Court found that the determination of indepen-
dence constituted a factual issue and thus re-
manded the case, reserving for a later day the
determination of whether in-court identification
could be excluded at all.s
In Crews, the Court faced and resolved that
reserved issue. The Crews decision raises two ques-
tions for analysis: first, whether a defendant's per-
son or a victim's in-court identification testimony
constitute suppressible evidence and second,
whether the Ker-Frisbie doctrine is dispositive of the
in-court identification issue. Both questions must
also be considered in terms of whether the exclu-
sionary rule's principles of deterrence and judicial
integrity should compel suppression of in-court
identification.
IV. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND IN-COURT
IDENTIFICATION
The Crews Court recognized that the in-court
identification presented a "fruit of the poisonous
tree" issue. Several factors must all be found to
exist in a particular case in order for the Court to
exclude evidence under this analysis. First, the
factual situation must include some evidence which
might be subject to suppression. Second, the gov-
ernment must have obtained this evidence through
an exploitation 54 of its illegal conduct. 5s Third, the
evidence must not derive from a source indepen-
dent of and untainted by the illegal police con-
duct.56 Finally, the principles of the exclusionary
50Id.
5' 388 U.S. 218.
52 Id. at 241. In Wade, the Court enumerated several
factors which would determine the admissibility of in-
court identification testimony. These factors include:
prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal
activity, the existence of any discrepancy between
any pre-lineup description and the defendant's ac-
tual description, any identification prior to the
lineup of another person, failure to identify the
defendant upon a prior occasion, and lapse of time
between the alleged act and a lineup identification.
Id. at 241.
5 Id. at 242.
54 For a discussion of the meaning of "exploitation,"
see note 69 & accompanying text infra.
55 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471.




rule must warrant suppression.5 7 This section will
consider each of these factors in relation to the
Court's decision in Crews.
In considering whether the in-court identifica-
tion should be excluded, members of the Court
differed as to whether Crews involved evidence
which could be subject to suppression. Five Jus-
ticess summarily concluded that a defendant's face
could never be considered suppressible as the fruit
of an illegal arrest.5 9 Three others6° pointed out
that when a victim identifies a defendant, "his
physiognomy becomes something of evidentiary
value, much like a photograph showing respondent
at the scene of the crime.",
6
1
The evidentiary question is indeed technical. An
in-court identification may be considered as evi-
dence in several ways. For example, the defendant
himself may constitute the evidence, but no court
has held that a defendant's face itself constitutes
material or demonstrative evidence.6 2 Although
witnesses may point out the defendant as the cul-
prit who committed the crime, the defendant's face
is never actually entered into evidence. Thus, such
identification testimony differs from the founda-
tion testimony which precedes the admission into
evidence of an inanimate object, such as drugs,
clothing, or guns.63 Since the defendant's face is
never formally admitted into evidence, it cannot
itself be evidence. In this sense, the Crews majority
correctly concluded that the case did not present a
"fruits" question.
Yet on the basis of different considerations, an
in-court identification may constitute evidence. As
57 Compare Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 with Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206.58justices Powell, Blackmun, White, Rehnquist, and
Chief Justice Burger.
59 100 S. Ct. at 1253 (Powell, J., concurring); id.
(White, J., concurring).
Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Brennan.
61 100 S. Ct. at 1252.
6 In Stevenson v. Matthews, 529 F.2d 61 (7th Cir.
1976), the defendant argued that he was suppressible
evidence. In that case, police searched and arrested the
defendant pursuant to an invalid warrant. Defendant
was indicted on charges of narcotics possession. Later
defendant was charged by an information with narcotics
sales. He challenged the sale charge on the basis that if
the police had not come to his home to execute the
defective search warrant, they could not have identified
him in connection with the sale charge. Thus, the de-
fendant contended that he constituted tainted evidence.
Without explaining its reasoning, the court rejected this
argument and found that the in-court identification was
admissible. Id. at 63.
6 The foundation for the admissibility of tangible
evidence is basically that the object itself is authentic.
Justice Brennan implied, a defendant's physiog-
nomy has some probative value. This value accrues
only when the victim identifies the defendant as
the individual who committed the crime. Without
this link, neither the defendant's face nor the vic-
tim's testimony would arguably constitute relevant
evidence. In this sense, a defendant's face is much
like a fingerprint found at the scene of the crime.
The fingerprint has no evidentiary value until
linked with a particular person, usually accom-
plished through the testimony of a crime lab ex-
pert. This view of an in-court identification thus
consists of two types of evidence: the tangible
object of the defendant and the linking testimony
of the victim.
Since the defendant's presence in court is assured
by his arrest, the crucial factor in the identification
becomes the victim's testimony, which itself ob-
viously constitutes evidence. Indeed, testimony is a
kind of evidence which may be excluded. Even
though the exclusionary rule most often prevents
the use of tangible evidence, the Court in Wong Sun
v. United States' stated that "verbal evidence which
derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and
unauthorized arrest ... is no less the 'fruit' of offi-
cial illegality than the more common tangible fruits
of the unwarranted intrusion. ' ' 5 The Court noted
that the underlying policies of the exclusionary
rule did not "invite any logical distinction between
physical and verbal evidence."' The Court has
treated identification testimony in cases involving
identifications made during a pretrial lineup as
falling within the Wong Sun rule.67 Thus, if the
victim's testimony itself constitutes evidence, the
Crews majority concluded too hastily that the case
presented no evidence that might be subject to
suppression.
Assuming that the suppressible evidence can
consist not of the defendant's face but of testimony
given by the victim or witnesses, the next factor in
applying the exclusionary rule is whether police
obtained such testimony as a result of illegal con-
duct. The Court avoided this question by framing
the issue differently. In a portion of the opinion
joined by the entire Court, Justice Brennan stated
that the in-court testimony was not a product of
the illegal arrest for three reasons: the victim's
presence in court was not due to any illegality; the
64371 U.S. 471.
Id. at 485.
6 Id. at 486.
67 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293; Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia, 388 U.S. 263; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218.
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illegal arrest had not tainted the victim's memory;
and any illegality surrounding the defendant's
presence in court was irrelevant to the suppression
issue.68 The Court thus disagreed with the finding
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that
the in-court identification was causally related to
or an exploitation of the illegal arrest.69
While the second factor7" of the Court's reason-
ing correctly indicates that the victim's identifica-
tion emanated from her memory of the crime, the
Court's analysis neglects to consider how the gov-
ernment utilized that memory to implicate the
defendant. The victim's mnemonic representation
itself has little probative value until matched with
the defendant's physiognomy. In Crews, this match-
ing did not occur until after the police procured
photographs of Crews during the illegal detention.
The logical chain of causation is straight and nar-
row: the illegal arrest produced photographs,
which in turn resulted in the victim's identification
of Crews and his subsequent arrest and prosecu-
tion.
Upon finding such a causal connection between
an illegal arrest and an ultimate identification,
several courts have excluded the in-court identifi-
cation testimony. 7' These courts employ a strict
logical relation test, reasoning that but for the
arrest the victim would not have had the oppor-
tunity to identify the defendant. Indeed, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals employed this
analysis in deciding Crews.
72
The Supreme Court rightly rejected this but-for
analysis.73 From a practical standpoint, it is likely
that legal police identification procedures would
eventually lead to the defendant's arrest. Thus, it
is unreasonable that "but for the illegal arrest the
[defendant] would have remained at large indefi-
nitely." 74 In addition, when determining whether
to exclude evidence, the Court has rejected a purely
but-for connection as a reason for exclusion. 75 In-
68 100 S. Ct. at 1250.
69 389 A.2d at 289.
70The first factor involving the victim's presence in
court does not lend itself to further analysis. The Court's
treatment of the third factor is discussed below. See note
108 & accompanying text infra.
71 United States v. Barragan-Martinez, 504 F.2d 1155
(9th Cir. 1974). See also People v. Glover, 64 II1. App. 3d
662, 381 N.E.2d 439 (1978).
72Crews v. United States, 389 A.2d 277, 289 (1978).
73 100 S. Ct. at 1250.
74 Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 266, 293
A.2d 33, 38 (1972). See also Wyatt v. State, 566 S.W.2d
597, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
75 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 488. See also
stead, the Court has developed a more sophisti-
cated test of the causal relation between the illegal
police conduct and the evidence sought to be
used.76
The essence of the Court's causation test is
whether police exploited the illegality by purpose-
fully engaging in illegal conduct to obtain the
evidence.77 In Davis v. Mississippi,78 police took the
defendant into custody, without probable cause, as
part of a dragnet investigation of a rape. Police
later matched the fingerprints obtained during the
illegal detention with those found at the scene of
the crime. In holding that the fingerprints must be
excluded, the Court disdained the use of illegal
detentions to gather evidence. The Court stated
that all evidence obtained in violation of the Con-
stitution, no matter how relevant and trustworthy,
was inadmissible.79
One federal court has utilized the Davis exploi-
tation rationale to exclude an in-court identifica-
tion. In United States v. Edmons,8° police arrested the
defendants on the pretext of not having selective
service cards in their possession in order to obtain
identification evidence for a separate incident. As
a result of the arrest, Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion agents were able to identify the defendants as
participants in the earlier crime. The court found
that the "arrests were a necessary cause of the in-
court identification testimony," since the agents
had not been able to identify the defendants on
subsequent trips to the scene of the crime.8' The
court held that:
When the police, not knowing the perpetrator's iden-
tity, make an arrest in deliberate violation of the
Fourth Amendment for the very purpose of exhibit-
ing a person before the victim and with a view
toward having any resulting identification dupli-
cated at trial, the fulfilment of this objective is as
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
7 In Brown v. Illinois, the Court developed a causal
connection test to determine the admissibility of state-
ments obtained after an illegal arrest. The test consists of
three factors: the temporal proximity of the arrest and
confession, the presence of intervening factors, and the
flagrancy of the official misconduct. 422 U.S. at 602-04.
See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200.
77 For a discussion of the Court's treatment of police
conduct in considering whether to exclude evidence, see
Note, Admissibility of Statements Obtained During an Illegal
Detention, 70 J. CRIM. L. & C. 446, 455-56 (1979).
78 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
79 Id. at 724.
"°432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970).
8' Id. at 583.
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much an exploitation of 'the primary illegality' as
where a defendant is arrested without probable cause
in the expectation that a search or the taking of
fingerprints.., will yield evidence that will convict
him of a crime .... 82
Many state courts have also employed the Wong
Sun-Davis exploitation analysis. These courts have
generally admitted in-court identification testi-
mony when the police acted in good faith, even
though a trial court later determined that the arrest
lacked probable cause.8 They have also admitted
such testimony when the identification was made
incident to an arrest whose sole purpose was not
exploitation.8 However, when police engage in a
ruse to obtains photographs for use in identifica-
tion 85 or when police use illegally seized evidence
to obtain identifications, 8 6 courts have excluded in-
court identification testimony as the product of the
illegal police conduct. Thus, these state exclusion
cases and Edmons show that an in-court identifica-
tion is no different from any other type of evidence
obtained by means of purposefully illegal conduct.
In Crews, the police obtained the victim's iden-
tification of Crews from photographs procured dur-
ing an unlawful arrest. The Court's statement of
the facts indicates that park police knew that they
lacked probable cause to arrest Crews but detained
him solely to take a photograph. In spite of these
facts, the majority in Crews employed no detailed
exploitation analysis.
Only Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Stewart
recognized that an in-court identification could be
inadmissible given exploitive police conduct. How-
ever, these Justices distinguished Davis by conceiv-
2Id. at 584.
8 People v. Price, 76 111. App. 3d 613, 394 N.E.2d 1256
(1979) (police photographed defendant as part of regular
booking procedures); People v. Washington, 60 Ill. App.
3d 662, 377 N.E.2d 397 (1978) (arresting officer did not
request photographing of defendant).
See Cunningham v. United States, 391 A.2d 1360
(D.C. 1978) (police made identification of defendant
when he voluntarily surrendered even though police had
learned his identity from a previous illegal search); Her-
bert v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 798 (Ky. App. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1979) (victim unexpectedly met
and spontaneously identified defendant at police station).
8 See People v. Howard, 90 Misc. 2d 662,395 N.Y.S.2d
385 (Sup. Ct. 1977), where police induced defendant to
appear on her front porch for a photograph by giving
her a false excuse to leave the house.
8See People v. Pleasant, 101 Misc. 2d 154, 420
N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1979). There, during an illegal
stop and search, police obtained a stolen revolver. They
then showed photographs of the defendant to the owner
of the gun.
ing a new standard of exploitation. Brennan im-
plied that when police have reasonable suspicion
that an individual committed a crime, identifica-
tion evidence may be admitted. While this view is
tailored to the facts of Crews, these Justices at least
attempted to employ an exploitation analysis con-
sistent with the Court's exclusionary rule prece-
dent.
Perhaps one reason why the Crews Court did not
thoroughly analyze the exploitation question is
that the trial court found that the victim identified
Crews from her independent recollection of the
criminal incident. 87 The Court likened this inde-
pendent memory with two distinct but related
concepts: (1) evidence deriving from an indepen-
dent source; and (2) the independent origin test
applied to determine whether a particular identi-
fication procedure has been unfairly suggestive. 8
The Court has long exempted from the exclu-
sionary rule evidence deriving from an indepen-
dent source. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States,89 Justice Holmes stated that even though
evidence may be illegally obtained, "this does not
mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred
and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained
from an independent source they may be proved
like any others, but the knowledge gained by the
Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in
the way proposed."' The Crews Court, as well as
many other courts which have considered the
in-court identification issue,9 1 equated an individ-
ual's memory with an independent source.
This view may not be entirely accurate. The
pertinent evidence or facts with relation to in-court
identification is the victim's testimony. While this
testimony derives from memory, the memory itself
is of little probative value until correlated with a
photographic or in-person identification of the de-
fendant. Only after this correlation does the iden-
tification become complete evidence. In the terms
of Silverthorne, the government gains knowledge of
this complete evidence through its own wrongful
conduct since the photograph obtained by means
of an illegal arrest leads to the ultimate in-court
identification. Therefore, an independent recollec-
87 100 S. Ct. at 1251.
88 Id. at 1251 n. 18.
89 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385.
90 Id. at 392.
"' See Terry v. Peyton, 433 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1970);
State v. Timley, 541 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. App. 1976); Com-




tion cannot be equated with an independent source
for exclusionary rule purposes.
The Crews Court also discussed the trial court's
findings of independent recollection in terms of the
independent origins test. The Court normally ap-
plies the independent origins test in the context of
pretrial identifications. The Court seeks to deter-
mine whether a particular pretrial identification
resulted from unduly suggestive procedures92 or
whether the witness identified the defendant from
her memory of the incident, independent of the
suggestiveness. 93 Without this independence, the
Court presumes that suggestive pretrial identifica-
tions are mistaken and violate a defendant's due
process rights under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.94 Thus, reliability is the crux of the
constitutional right involved in pretrial procedures.
In contrast, the reliability and trustworthiness of
evidence is not a concern of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule. Since an application of the rule
is not a remedy for a given constitutional injury,
but is an attempt to deter illegal police conduct,
the rule regularly excludes trustworthy informa-
tion.95 Therefore, whereas reliability is essential
under a true independent origins test, the reasons
for that test do not apply in the fourth amendment
context. Indeed, the Crews Court recognized that
the independent origins test did not meet the un-
derlying concerns of the fourth amendment.9 For
purposes of this amendment then, an independent
recollection cannot be likened to a memory of
independent origin.
Indeed, an independent recollection is irrelevant
to fourth amendment analysis because that analysis
focuses on the essential right of protection against
unreasonable seizures. The probable cause require-
ment is a fundamental aspect of fourth amendment
protection. 7 In Davis the Court stated, "[n]othing
9 Procedures which may be suggestive include show-
ing one photograph to a victim or putting the defendant
in a lineup in which his physical characteristics are
unique.93 Thus, a memory is of an independent origin when
the identification is unaffected by illegal suggestive iden-
tification procedures.
9 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293; United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218. Cf. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98 (1977) (circumstances in which pretrial procedures do
not violate due process.)
95 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. at 724.
96 100 S. Ct. at 1251 n.19. However, since the Court
believed that Crews did not contain either tainted evi-
dence or evidence obtained by exploitive police conduct,
the Court did not further distinguish the independent
oriins test as it would apply to the fourth amendment.
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01 (1959).
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is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment
was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon
the personal security of our citizenry, whether these
intrusions be termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory de-
tentions.' ,,98 Indeed, the privacy protection deriv-
ing from the fourth amendment is "implicit in 'the
concept of ordered liberty.' ""
The Court formerly sought to protect these ideals
by invoking the exclusionary rule so as to remove
the incentive of police to violate constitutional
guarantees. In Mapp v. Ohio,1°° the Court observed
that even though the exclusionary rule operates to
set a criminal free, "it is the law that sets him free.
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse,




In recent years, the Court has become concerned
that frequent use of the exclusionary rule may
breed disrespect when people see criminals go
free. 0 2 Therefore, the Court has emphasized the
deterrence of illegal police conduct less than the
dangers of setting criminals free.
However, this recent emphasis confuses the con-
stitutional goal. Indeed, increasing numbers of ex-
clusionary rule cases may give the appearance that
many criminals go unpunished. Yet the instances
in which police invade the constitutional rights of
innocent persons never come before the courts in
an exclusionary rule posture.'0 3 The only way to
protect such innocent persons is to exclude "evi-
dence obtained against those who are frequently
guilty." '' While the present Court laments the
absence of empirical data demonstrating that the
exclusionary rule actually shapes police conduct, °5
the Court previously recognized that "[s]ince as a
practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative,
it is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could
ever be assembled."'' 6 Since empirical data cannot
be conclusive, the Court should balance in favor of
possible deterrence and exclude illegally obtained
evidence to prevent police from violating the fourth
amendment with impunity.
If the Court in Crews had wished to deter lawless
police conduct it would have done so by excluding
98 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. at 726-27.
99 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
'0o 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
'o' Id. at 659.
102 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 491.
103 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
104 Id.
1o5 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 492 n.32.
106 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 218.
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the in-court identification. By excluding this evi-
dence, the Court would have sent a message to
police that fourth amendment protections must be
respected at all times during a criminal investiga-
tion. However, acting consistently with other recent
decisions limiting the scope of the exclusionary
rule,10 7 the Court chose not to do so.
V. APPLICATION OF THE KER -FRIsBIE DOCTRINE TO
CREWS
Perhaps one reason why the Court did not fully
analyze the issue of whether the in-court identifi-
cation constituted suppressible evidence lies in the
apparently dispositive nature of a doctrine first
established in Ker v. Illinois"09 and later applied in
Frisbie v. Collins.109 Both cases involved situations in
which government agents forcibly brought a de-
fendant by unlawful means into the jurisdiction of
the court which tried him. In each case, the Court
found that such unlawful means did not prevent
the trial court from asserting jurisdiction. Thus, an
unlawful arrest does not bar prosecution. The Fris-
bie Court held that: "due process of law is satisfied
when one present in court is convicted of crime
after having been fairly apprized of the charges
against him and after a fair trial in accordance
with constitutional procedural safeguards."" 0 In
recent cases preceding Crews, the Court has reaf-
firmed that the means by which the defendant
appears in court will not bar prosecution."'
A majority of the Crews Court found that Ker-
Frisbie foreclosed any objection by the defendant
to in-court identification." 2 Since the doctrine ap-
plies to the manner in which a defendant appears
in court, these Justices placed more emphasis on
the arrest itself than on the separate issue of
whether the defendant himself constituted evi-
dence. Justices White, Burger, and Rehnquist rec-
ognized that if the defendant himself was an evi-
dentiary product of an illegal arrest, then such an
arrest would always prevent successful prosecution
where an in-court identification is essential."' To
107 See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2565 (1980);
United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980); United
States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 271 (1978); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465.
'08 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
109 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
"
0 Id. at 522.
"' See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465; Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. at 119.
112 100 S. Ct. at 1253 (Powell, J., concurring); id.
(White, J., concurring).
"3justice White stated that:
a holding that a defendant's face can be considered
prevent this result, the majority summarily con-
cluded that a defendant himself did not constitute
evidence." 4 Having overcome the tainted evidence
problem, the majority found that the illegal arrest
did not prevent the prosecution from proceeding,
since the in-court identification was "merely the
inevitable result of the trial being held .... 115
The majority's use of Ker-Frisbie is problematic.
In order to ensure a successful prosecuti6n, the
concurring Crews Justices applied Ker-Frisbie with-
out considering that the policies of that doctrine
differ from those of the exclusionary rule. Frisbie
recognized that a defendant must receive a fair
trial, even though he was brought illegally before
the court. The right to invoke the exclusionary rule
may be a due process concern, deriving from the
fourth amendment, which affects the fairness of a
trial. The scope of Ker-Frisbie is limited to whether
a court has properly asserted jurisdiction. Thus,
once the prosecution begins, the doctrine becomes
irrelevant to later evidentiary or procedural mat-
ters. Indeed, the Frisbie Court recognized that due
process is satisfied only after a "fair trial in accord-
ance with constitutional safeguards.""16 A fair trial
usually means the observance of safeguards specif-
ically stated in the Constitution, such as the right
to counsel or the right to confront adverse wit-
nesses."
7 However, due process and trial fairness
also involve other general safeguards. For example,
prosecutors must disclose material inculpatory ev-
idence upon the defendant's request."' Such gen-
eral safeguards usually derive from and help to
effectuate a specific constitutional right. In the
criminal discovery context, prosecutorial disclosure
serves to guarantee the observance of the right to
trial and the right to cross-examine witnesses.
The exclusionary rule similarly constitutes a gen-
evidence suppressible for no reason other than that
the defendant's presence in the courtroom is the
fruit of an illegal arrest would be tantamount to
holding that an illegal arrest effectively insulates
one from conviction for any crime where an in-court
identification is essential.
100 S. Ct. at 1253 (White, J., concurring).
14 100 S. Ct. at 1253 (Powell, J., concurring); id.
(White, J. concurring).
" 100 S. Ct. at 1254 (White, J., concurring).
"6 342 U.S. at 522.
1
7 The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
... ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; ...
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
U.S. CoNsT. amend VI.
11
8 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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eral safeguard, the application of which serves to
enforce fourth amendment guarantees against un-
reasonable search and seizure. While the fourth
amendment itself does not concern trial procedure,
the exclusionary rule applies to evidentiary matters
and is affected with due process concerns. Signifi-
cantly, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio," 9 used due
process reasoning to extend the exclusionary rule
to the states.'20 Thus, observance of the fourth
amendment through use of the exclusionary rule
constitutes a due process concern relating to the
fairness of a trial.
Although most courts have steadfastly applied
Ker-Frisbie,121 the Second Circuit has twice ques-
tioned the doctrine on due process grounds. In
United States v. Edmons,12 the court found Ker-Frisbie
unpersuasive because the cases were decided prior
to the fourth amendment's application to the states
and thus rested only upon general considerations
of due process.' 23 In United States v. Toscanino,' 24
where American agents kidnapped the defendant
in Uruguay and returned him to the United States
for prosecution on narcotic smuggling charges, the
court again declined to apply Frisbie. The Toscanino
court noted that the concept of due process had
expanded since Frisbie and was no longer confined
to the "guarantee of 'fair' procedure at trial."' 25
The court then stated that "[i]n an effort to deter
police misconduct, the term [due process] has been
extended to bar the government from realizing
directly the fruits of its own deliberate and unnec-
essary lawlessness in bringing the accused to
trial."' 26 Thus, the court concluded that due pro-
cess "now protects the accused against pretrial
illegality by denying to the government the fruits
of its exploitation" of any lawlessness.
27
Edmons and Toscanino point out that due process
may dictate the exclusion of evidence under the
fourth amendment even after the court has asserted
jurisdiction under Ker-Frisbie. Under this fairness
analysis, the Court should conduct an extensive
"9 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
'20 Id. at 654-55.
121 See, e.g., United States v. Millican, 600 F.2d 273
(5th Cir. 1979); Myers v. Rhay, 577 F.2d 504 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.
1975).
'" 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970).
'23 Id. at 583.
224 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 272.
126Id. (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
430-31 (1973)).
'2Id. at 275.
inquiry into whether the defendant himself consti-
tutes evidence rather than merely concluding that
he does not by relying on the Ker-Frisbie concept
that a defendant in court may be prosecuted. The
failure of the Crews majority to conduct a due
process fairness inquiry is not entirely without rea-
son. After Edmons and Toscanino, the Court held in
Stone v. Powell"2 that the exclusionary rule was not
a personal constitutional right. 129 Nevertheless,
even without being an enumerated right, the exclu-
sionary rule is so inextricably bound13 0 with the
implementation of the fourth amendment that its
use in judicial proceedings should involve the due
process considerations outlined in Edmons and Tos-
canino. 131
Regardless of whether the exclusionary rule in-
volves due process fairness, the reasoning of Toscan-
ino reveals a second problem with the Crews major-
ity's use of Ker-Frisbie. The concurring Justices
failed to distinguish the commencement of a pros-
ecution from the evidentiary concerns which arise
at trial. Jurisdiction and the admissibility of evi-
dence constitute two separate issues. When the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided
Crews, it was cognizant of this distinction. 32 That
court held that while the prosecution against Crews
could continue despite his illegal arrest, the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine did not prevent exclusion of tainted
evidence. The court noted that even if the exclusion
of such evidence eviscerated the prosecution's case,
Ker-Frisbie would not be violated because the exclu-
sion of evidence is a constituent part of the trial
proceedings.' 33 Indeed, the court pointed out that
in many instances the exclusion of tangible evi-
dence effectively ends the prosecution of a defend-
ant."M Yet this exclusion does not affect the court's
assertion of jurisdiction in the first instance.
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Stevens did rec-
" Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465.
'
9 Id. at 486.
" In Mapp, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule
is an essential part of the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. 367 U.S. at 657.
a ' If nothing else, such decisions as Stone indicate the
Court's present tendency to limit the scope of the exclu-
sionary rule. In Mapp, the Court considered the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence to be a constitutional right.
367 U.S. at 655-57. However, since Mapp the Court has
emphasized that the rule is only a judicially created
device. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. Given
this change, the Toscanino court properly reasoned on the
basis of Mapp.
'3 389 A.2d at 284-85.33 Id. at 286.
1d. at 288 n.6.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
ognize implicitly that Ker-Frisbie and the exclusion-
ary rule serve different functions. Justice Brennan
implied that in some circumstances an in-court
identification would be suppressible following an
illegal arrest. He indicated, for example, that ex-
clusion might be necessary where police illegally
obtained identification information before their
investigation had focused on a particular individ-
ual.1 35 This position implies that evidence obtained
through a constitutional violation would be ex-
cluded despite the apparent mandate of Ker-Frisbie
to prosecute in any event.
In contrast to the majority's opinion, Justice
Brennan's analysis thus places more importance on
protections of fourth amendment rights than on
successful prosecutions. His opinion recognizes that
the defendant's presence in court, when linked with
the victim's identification testimony, constitutes a
form of suppressible evidence. The suppression of
such evidence furthers the exclusionary rule's goal
of deterring fourth amendment violations. The fact
that such exclusion may frustrate the prosecution
is simply a cost of the rule.
Since the in-court identification might have con-
stituted suppressible evidence,136 it appears as
though the Crews majority relied upon Ker-Frisbie
to insure not only that the prosecution would
begin, but that it would also result in conviction.
In recent cases, the Court has sought to narrow the
exclusionary rule by emphasizing successful prose-
cution. 137 While this is a meritorious goal, the Crews
majority did not strive to achieve it in a principled
manner. The suppression of an in-court identifi-
cation belongs under the rubric of evidentiary
proceedings, and is not merely a result of the trial
being held under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
"' 100 S. Ct. at 1252.
136 See note 107 & accompanying text supra.
137 See notes 62-67 & accompanying text supra.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Crews, the Court refused to extend the exclu-
sionary rule to in-court identifications where the
police had arrested the defendant illegally. The
Court found that such in-court testimony did not
constitute evidence tainted by illegality. However,
while the defendant himself may not be evidence,
identification testimony may constitute suppressi-
ble evidence. Identification testimony is tainted
when the government obtains it through purpose-
ful, illegal conduct. Since the police detained Crews
for the purpose of taking his photograph and since
the government would not have been able to iden-
tify, arrest, and prosecute Crews without the illegal
photographs, the Court could have applied its own
exclusionary rule principles to suppress the in-court
identification. The Court's reliance on the victim's
independent memory of the defendant does not
answer the fourth amendment issue because the
government did not match the victim's memory
with the defendant by means of an untainted
process and because a memory of independent
origin is not relevant to fourth amendment analy-
sis. The Court's refusal to employ a complete ex-
clusionary rule analysis indicates that Crews repre-
sents another case in which the Court has placed
a greater emphasis on successful prosecutions than
on fourth amendment rights.
This balance in favor of prosecution is also in-
dicated by the opinion of five Justices that the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine controlled in Crews. These Justices
did not distinguish the fact that the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine and the exclusionary rule serve different
purposes. An assertion of jurisdiction under Ker-
Frisbie is not tantamount to insuring that the de-
fendant receive a fair trial. Thus, even though the
exclusion of evidence may fatally weaken the pros-
ecution's case, such exclusion does not affect the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
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